Franklin Credit Management Corporation v. Blaine J. Hanney : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Franklin Credit Management Corporation v. Blaine
J. Hanney : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Laura S. Scott; Matthew D. Cook; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Appellant.
Brad C. Smith; Stevenson & Smith; Attorney for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Franklin Credit Management Corporation v. Hanney, No. 20100228 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2237
In the Utah Court of Appeals 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Appellate Case No. 20100228-CA 
vs. Trial Court No. 050700241 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, et al. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Reply Brief of Cross-Appellees 
An Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, 
Jt^ge^od^rrey-P^ge^nd-JudgeXlavid-CQnnots, 
Laura S. Scott, No. 6649 Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Matthew D. Cook, No. 10751 Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 3986 Washington Boulevard 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Ogden, Utah 84403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone (801) 394 4573 
Telephone (801) 532 1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellant, and Attorney for Defendants, Appellees 
Cross-Appellee and Cross-Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
N3V16 2BB Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the Utah Court of Appeals 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Appellate Case No. 20100228-CA 
vs. Trial Court No. 050700241 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, et al. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Reply Brief of Cross-Appellees 
An Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, 
Jtidge-Rodney-Page-and JudgeDavid -Connors 
Laura S. Scott, No. 6649 Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Matthew D. Cook, No. 10751 Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
Parsons, Behie & Latimer 3986 Washington Boulevard 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Ogden, Utah 84403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone (801) 394 4573 
Telephone (801) 532 1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellant, and Attorney for Defendants, Appellees 
Cross-Appellee and Cross-Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities ii 
Cases ii 
Statutes ii 
Other Legal Authorities ii 
Argument 1 
Conclusion 8 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction. 1999 UT 87, 977 P.2d 
518 6 
Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1984) 5 
Green v. Nelson, 232 P.2d 776 (Utah 1951) 4 
Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1914) 5 
Tanqaro v. Marrero. 373 P.2d 390 (Utah 1962) 6 
United State v. Kithcast, 218 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000) 7 
statutes - - - - -•- -- - - - - - - - —-
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 43 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 . . . 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 6 
Utah R. Evd. 803(6) 5 
Utah R. Evid. 902(9) 5 
Other Legal Authorities 
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d. § 2770 4 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the Utah Court of Appeals 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Appellate Case No. 20100228-CA 
vs. Trial Court No. 050700241 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, etal. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Reply Brief of Cross-Appellees 
Argument 
Piaintiffs'/Cross-Appellees' brief is a pastiche of what-ifs, might-have-beens, and 
maybes. Plaintiff/Cross-Appellee studiously ignores what has actually occurred. It is 
undisputed that the Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint seeking a judicial 
foreclosure of Blaine and Shirley Hanney's interest in the property. First Amended 
Complaint, R. at 29, 34, and 37. At no point during the process of this litigation has 
Plaintiff ever indicated that it intended to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure.1 
Moreover, Plaintiff sought a judicial foreclosure as its remedy following the trial. 
At the conclusion of the litigation, in its written closing argument, Plaintiff sought 
Consequently this court should entered [sic] an order and judgment that 
(a) the Bank One Trustee has a valid lien on the property; (b) the Bank 
One Trust Deed is in default; and (c) Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose the 
1. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Default, a step preparatory to the commencement 
of a non-judicial foreclosure on 3 February 2003. Subsequently, Plaintiff fiied the 
present action, on 6 May 2005. R. at 1. At no point during the present litigation has 
Plaintiff ever indicated any intent to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure. 
1 
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Bank One Trust Deed to satisfy the amounts due and owing under the 
Bank One Trust Deed, including interest and attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in the action. 
R. at 1080. Plaintiff now ignores its demand for judicial foreclosure as a mechanism to 
escape the consequences of its evidentiary failings. Plaintiff's effort should be seen for 
the feckless struggle it is. 
Not until Defendants/Cross-Appellants, in response to this request, pointed out 
that the Plaintiff had utterly failed to adduce evidence of the amount due and owing 
under the Trust Deed, did Plaintiff seek to re-open the evidence. Absent proof of the 
amount owing as of a date certain and interest rates, Plaintiff cannot prevail on a 
judicial foreclosure. Utah law is clear that a judgment of foreclosure "shall include" "the 
amount due, with costs and disbursements." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901(2). 
It is elementary that in order for a court to make a "finding," a court must have 
sufficient evidence upon which to base such a finding. In response, Plaintiff makes an 
outre argument: "there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901 et seq. or the case 
law cited by Defendants requiring such evidence to be presented at trial." Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 19-20. Since the mortgage foreclosure statute 
required a judgment to include a finding of "the amount due," one is left to wonder, from 
Plaintiffs argument, exactly when and where Plaintiff would present such evidence? Of 
course, Plaintiff pursued a similar approach through summary judgment; which the trial 
court denied. With the denial of Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, trial became 
the sole process to present evidence. On some level, this concept is so elementary 
that it cannot be gainsaid; indeed, Utah R. Civ. P. 43 expressly so directs ("[i]n all trials, 
the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court"). Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
2 
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impliedly requires that findings of fact be predicated upon evidence presented in open 
court. Evidence is presented to the court at trial and not in some other forum. 
At trial, Plaintiff admits that the sole evidence presented at trial even touching the 
issue of the amount of the indebtedness was trial Exhibit 59. Reply Brief of Appellant 
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 20. A copy of Exhibit 59 was attached to the Brief of 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant as Appendix L. Exhibit 59-pages long, but with a short, 
ambiguous three-line statement-is insufficient in any event. It simply provides, in 
pertinent part: 
3
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When the Plaintiff introduced this exhibit, it did not focus a single question on this figure 
and did not use this exhibit in any sense to establish the amount owing under the Trust 
Deed. Indeed, a review of the transcript reveals that all of the questioning regarding 
Exhibit 59 was directed to different issues. R. at 385, Vol. I, 259-62; R. at 1386, Vol. II, 
6-10. Moreover, there is no basis from the evidence for the court to conclude whether 
this figure represents a principle figure, principle with interest, principle with interest as 
of a date certain, or some other and different amount. 
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that this same figure was produced by Plaintiff in 
initial disclosures and in other material. None of these materials were ever presented to 
3 
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the trial court as trial evidence or subjected to any cross-examination. Plaintiff also 
makes much of the fact that Blaine Hanney did not question or contradict these figures. 
The answer for his failure to ask any questions is obvious: Blaine Hanney had no 
knowledge of the Trust Deed at all, much less of payments that Shirley Hanney might 
have made against it. Blaine Hanney, having no knowledge of the Trust Deed at all, 
had no knowledge as to how payments were applied or other figures calculated. Blaine 
Hanney was not in a position to contest the amounts owing. 
Plaintiff, as the party seeking affirmative recovery, it bore the burden of proof on 
all issues at trial relative to its requested relief. Green v. Nelson, 232 P.2d 776, 781 
(Utah 1951 )("as a general rule in actions for breach of contract, he who seeks 
damages, bears the burden of proof). See also Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d, § 2770 ("a plaintiff in a declaratory action who voluntarily 
goes forward and attempts to prove his case will be held to have assumed the risk of 
nonpersuasion."). A judicial foreclosure partakes of aspects of both contract and 
declaratory actions: a breach of an agreement is the central finding given rise to a right 
to recover; the court must also declare the amount owing under the mortgage or trust 
deed which is to be foreclosed. Under any view, the burden of proof was always 
squarely on the Plaintiff with respect to the judicial foreclosure.2 
The pre-trial order did not shift the burden. The total indebtedness, interest, and 
related figures were not stipulated issues of fact. These items of fact were essential 
2. Defendant Hanney readily acknowledges that the burden of proof on his 
counterclaim for a declaration that the trust deed was invalid was always on him. The 
trial court found that Defendant had carried this burden. 
4 
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elements of proof that could be proved in any number of ways. The mere fact that 
Plaintiff failed to either (1) obtain a stipulation or (2) identify them as contested issues of 
fact did not discharge Plaintiff's duty in any degree. Utah law is clear that the facts 
justifying judicial foreclosure must be predicated upon "evidence in the record." 
Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. 
Liechtenstein, 145 P. 1036, 1038 (Utah 1914). 
Plaintiff also suggests that because Defendant Blaine Hanney did not controvert 
this issue strongly in the pre-trial stages of this litigation, or during trial, that this 
somehow indicates his agreement with the figure. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. When the Plaintiffs initial disclosures failed to list any bank officer as a potential 
witness, and when subsequent answers to interrogatories did not list bank officers as 
witnesses, Defendant Blaine Hanney made the strategic decision to simply wait and 
see what evidence Plaintiff's adduced at trial in order to determine how he shouid react. 
Once the final pre-trial order was signed, without a disclosure of additional witnesses or 
a stipulation as to the amount owing, Defendant was prepared to address the issue 
during trial. Plaintiff's complete failure to present evidence, however, made the issue 
moot. Absent evidence of indebtedness as of a date certain, Plaintiff loses. 
It is startling how easily Plaintiff might have proved this point. Assuming 
$245,590.25 is the principle, as of a date certain, Plaintiff needed merely to produce 
self-authenticating affidavits from its predecessor-in-interest and itself. Utah R. 
Evd. 803(6), 902(9), and 902(H). Plaintiff appears to argue that since the point might 
have easily have been proved, it is excused from proof. Of course, the converse is the 
true point: since the matter was so easily provable, the failure to offer proof is even less 
5 
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excusable. Indeed, it is the complexity of the proof that justified the re-opener in 
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 1999 UT 87, ffij 22-24, 
977 P.2d 518. Here, plaintiff's proof was simplicity itself; the failure of that proof is 
perplexing. 
This case is remarkably similar to Tanqaro v. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah 
1962). In Tanqaro, Plaintiff mistakenly sued on a satisfied note. After trial, Plaintiff 
realized the error and sought to reopen the evidence. The trial court denied the motion 
to re-open, and the Supreme Court noted that the trial court had not abused its 
discretion. Tanqaro, 373 P.2d at 391. Additionally, however, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that "[i]t is elementary that the trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial" 
absent meeting the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 59. Presumably, the same applies 
to re-opening evidence after each side has rested. Here, no attempt to comply with 
Rule 59 was made or even articulated. 
Plaintiff simply took no care whatsoever for the basic elements of proof of its 
case. It was only after the evidence was complete-and both sides rested-, and 
Plaintiff's failure was made clear, that Plaintiff then sought to re-open the evidence. 
Plaintiff's motion was too little to late, and it was an abuse of discretion to open the 
evidence at that point.3 
Two other points are also bewildering. First, Plaintiff asserts that it offered an 
explanation for its failure to present the needed evidence, citing to the record at pages 
3. Even when given the opportunity to re-open the evidence, the Plaintiff 
undertook no effort to actually present the evidence at trial. Plaintiff did present to 
Defendant a document similar to the one attached to Plaintiffs Reply Brief, and 
Defendant promptly filed an objection to the document on hearsay grounds. R. at 
1268-69. 
6 
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1144-46. Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 22. A review of these 
pages reveals nothing by way of an explanation for Plaintiff's failure to present 
evidence. An adequate explanation is a condition precedent to re-opening the 
evidence. United State v. Kithcast 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff was 
never offered any explanation at all. Plaintiff cites the Record at pages 1144-46. 
These pages are attached hereto as Exhibit B. A review will reveal no explanation at 
all. 
Second, Plaintiff continues to assert that the issue in question is a matter of 
"simple math." Amazingly, although this matter was addressed at closing argument, 
addressed a second time as part of the motion to re-open the evidence, and addressed 
a third time in the appellate briefing, even at this stage, Plaintiff has never stated the 
amount it beiieves to be due and owing under the Trust Deed. Moreover, Plaintiff 
cannot so state without some indication of what the principle amount is, as of a date 
certain. Without establishing that foundational issue, no "simple math" calculation is 
possible. Even assuming that $245,590.25 is the amount owing under the trust deed 
as of some date, what is that date? Interest owing cannot be calculated without 
evidence of the date. Even with the reopening of the evidence, Plaintiff has never 
presented any evidence whatsoever as of the date the interest runs from. 
Accordingly, the trial court was left in an impossible position, had it determined to 
rule in Plaintiff's favor. There was insufficient evidence from which to make the 
required findings. It is not enough to find the principal amount, the trial court was also 
required to find the interest. Interest, reflecting the time-value of money, requires proof 
of dates. No where in the record are the required dates ever expressed. Even after the 
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evidence was reopened, Plaintiff faiied to present the required evidence. The trial 
court's decision to re-open the evidence was erroneous and an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie case precludes any further recovery for 
exactly the reasons articulated by Defendant Hanney in his written closing argument. 
R. at 1098-1102. 
Conclusion 
Plaintiff may well be correct that it would be a matter of relatively simple 
evidentiary presentation to establish the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed. 
The fact that this may be correct makes Plaintiff's failure to present this evidence all the 
more problematic. The trial court erred in re-opening the evidence. The trial court's 
decision should be reversed, and the conclusion of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Alternatively, should the trial court's decision be reversed, the trial court's decision to 
reopen should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of Defendant. 
DATED this / £ day of November, 2010. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
^Brad C. Sfrnith 
Attorney for Defendants Hanney 
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